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LETTER
Emergence and spread of novel H5N8, H5N5 and H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4 highly
pathogenic avian influenza in 2020
Nicola S. Lewisa,b, Ashley C. Banyarda, Elliot Whittarda, Talgat Karibayevc, Thamer Al Kafagid, Ilya Chvalae,
Alex Byrnea, Saduakassova Meruyert (Akberovna)f, Jacqueline Kingh, Timm Harderh, Christian Grundh,
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ABSTRACT
Analyses of HPAI H5 viruses from poultry outbreaks across a wide Eurasian region since July 2020 including the Russian
Federation, Republics of Iraq and Kazakhstan, and recent detections in migratory waterfowl in the Netherlands, revealed
undetected maintenance of H5N8, likely in galliform poultry since 2017/18 and both H5N5 and H5N1. All viruses belong
to A/H5 clade 2.3.4.4b with closely related HA genes. Heterogeneity in Eurasian H5Nx HPAI emerging variants threatens
poultry production, food security and veterinary public health.
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The emergence of H5N8 HPAIV across
Eurasia
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses
continue to threaten poultry production and food
security throughout Eurasia, the Middle East and
Africa [1]. Here we characterize the emerging events
in Eurasia and assess evolution, diffusion and risk
mitigation. Since 2008, the H5Nx clades have steadily
evolved to constitute a genetically and antigenically
broad series of isolates (assessed in [2]). Prior to the
detection of H5N8 viruses in poultry in the Republic
of Iraq in May 2020, in Russia in July and August
2020 and in Kazakhstan during September 2020,
small H5N8 outbreaks had been reported in early
2020 across the European poultry sector (Figure 1
(A)). The HA genes of European clade 2.3.4.4b
H5N8 viruses detected during the first six months of
2020 clustered into two distinct groups – one within
Bulgaria with genetic relationships to previously
detected viruses in the country since 2018, and one
monophyletic clade of viruses from early 2020
detected in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany
and Poland. The phylogenetic patterns within Europe
in early 2020 suggested that some H5N8 viruses were
being maintained in European poultry whilst
additional new variants from unknown sources were
being sporadically introduced into other European
countries e.g. Hungary, Germany, the Czech Republic
and Poland with detection in wild and domestic birds
(Figure 1(B)).
In May 2020, the Republic of Iraq reported H5N8
in poultry, having not detected outbreaks for over a
year. Whole genome sequence data demonstrated
that a new H5 2.3.4.4b variant had emerged, with a
complete gene cassette indicating the closest genetic
relatives as being those from the Eurasian 2.3.4.4b
H5 outbreaks in 2017/18. The long branch lengths
for all segments to these closest relatives suggested
that the virus had been circulating undetected for
the intervening period and that this circulation
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possibly occurred in galliform poultry, as there was no
evidence of reassortment (Figure 1(B)).
Following outbreaks in Iraq, detections of H5N8 in
the Chelyabinskaya Oblast (Chelyabinsk), southern
central Russia were reported in late July 2020 and
impacted on backyard chickens, geese and ducks.
Interaction with wild birds was stated as the most
likely incursion route [3]. A total of 11 cases were
described in the period from August to September in
Tyumen, Omsk and Kurgan.
Concurrent with H5 detections in Russia were out-
breaks in neighbouring Kazakhstan, in backyard poul-
try, across the north-central region of the country,
including Kostanay, Akmola, and Pavlodar. Culling
of flocks was undertaken alongside implementation
of surveillance zones and vaccination. Samples sub-
mitted by the National Veterinary Reference Centre,
Kazakhstan to the Animal and Plant Health Agency,
UK on FTA cards were triaged diagnostically for viral
nucleic acid. All samples were positive for H5N8
nucleic acid by subtype-specific real-time RT-PCR
[4,5]. Genetic analyses of the whole genomes from
the Kazakhstan outbreaks demonstrated that for all
segments they were highly similar to the H5N8 virus
from Iraq as evidenced by relatively short branch
lengths within this Iraqi-like cluster linked by a long
branch to ancestral strains (Figure 1(B)).
H5 HPAI was detected in nine Eurasian Wigeons
(Mareca Penelope) in the Netherlands that were caught
onOctober 16, andwhole genome sequences were gen-
erated for four of these and deposited onto GISAID
(Figure 1(B)). The H5N8 virus detected in oneWigeon
(A_Eurasian_Wigeon_Netherland-
s_7_2020_AH5N8_2020_10_16) was “Iraqi-like” for
all gene segments. However, the H5N1 viruses (n=3)
had an HA and MP gene segment which were “Iraqi-
like” but there was evidence for reassortment with Eur-
asian avian lineage LPAI genes in all other gene seg-
ments. Closest relatives for these gene reassortants
ranged in location from across Eurasia and North
Africa and in time from 2010 to 2019, suggesting
under-surveillance of the genetic diversity of avian
influenza viruses in both wild and domestic birds and
that attempting to estimate the time to most recent
common ancestor for this emergence would likely be
confounded by such under-surveillance.
H5 HPAI was detected in a Common buzzard
(Buteo buteo) on 29 October and a Barnacle Goose
(Branta leucopsis) on 30 October in Germany, and
whole genome sequences were generated and depos-
ited onto GISAID. The H5N8 virus detected in the
barnacle goose was “Iraqi-like” for all gene segments.
However, the H5N5 virus detected in the buzzard
was “Iraqi-like” for all genes except PA, where it clus-
tered with Russian Federation LPAI H3N1 viruses
from 2018. The N5 NA from the buzzard clustered
with the H5N5 from the Russian Federation. None


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (A) Map showing highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in Europe, Western Asia and the Middle East in 2020.
Simplified representations of waterbird migratory flyways are overlaid. Location of outbreaks was obtained from Empres-i, the
European animal disease notification system (ADNS) and from OIE immediate notification reports. Maps were generated using
ArcGIS Pro 2.4.3. (B) Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of the HA, and PB2, PB1, PA, NP, NA, MP and NS genes. May–Novem-
ber 2.3.4.4 emergent viruses are highlighted in red. January–April 2.3.4.4 viruses are highlighted in blue. The pdf is zoomable.
Relationships among the Eurasian 2020 H5 HPAI strains were inferred by adding the novel whole genome sequence data to
data available on GisAID Epiflu downloaded on 5th November 2020. These data were aligned with MAFFT v7.407, manually
curated and phylogenetic trees inferred using IQTree and ultrafast bootstrap node support. Trees were drawn using FigTree
v1.4.4, rooted by A/duck/England/36226/2014 except for NA which was mid-point rooted, and nodes places in ascending order.
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detected between 16th January and 27th March 2020,
clustered with earlier 2020 outbreak strains from
Europe.
On 1 November H5 HPAI was detected in a
chicken in the United Kingdom. Genetic analyses
showed that this H5N8 virus was entirely “Iraqi-
like”. To date, there have been no wild bird detections
in the UK.
Across these detections, the HA cleavage site was
poly-basic in nature for all analysed viruses
(PLREKRRKRGLF), therefore satisfying international
criteria for a HPAIV. Analysis of HA data enabled typ-
ing of the HA clade and all samples from Iraq, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Netherlands were
classified as HA clade 2.3.4.4b utilizing the proposed
update to the unified nomenclature for HPAI A(H5)
viruses [6]. Comparisons with putative vaccine strains
have shown genetic heterogeneity in the HA, and the
need to subtype match the NA has not been assessed
but might impact vaccine performance.
Evaluation and risk mitigation
The emergence of these clade 2.3.4.4b H5 viruses in
Eurasia has significant implications for the poultry
sector across Europe, Central Asia, The Middle East
and Africa during winter 2020–2021 [7]. An alert
has already been raised for increased vigilance across
northern and eastern Europe based on historic out-
breaks in Russia and subsequent spread of disease in
both 2005 and 2016 [8,9]. The heterogeneity already
detected in these emergent viruses poses significant
challenges in assessing host tropism, pathogenesis,
routes of transmission and disease dispersal and
above all defining efficacious risk mitigation strategies.
Enhanced surveillance in both wild and domestic
birds is warranted and should also focus on both dom-
estic galliform and anseriform production systems.
This should include assessment of genetic diversity
of all Influenza A viruses to enable more accurate
determinations of virus evolution including through
reassortment. If vaccination is considered it is impera-
tive to strain match as closely as possible, given the
substantial amino acid mismatches already evident at
the HA-level.
Pathways for transmission of these variants are
unclear at this stage. The short branch lengths within
the “Iraqi-like” cluster might indicate a role for poul-
try-mediated or indirect transmission at least initially
in Central Asia. The H5N8 virus and the H5N1 virus
reassortant clearly infected wild birds migrating to
Europe as evidenced by the Wigeons in the Nether-
lands, but whether the H5N1 or H5N8 virus would
be better maintained in wild anseriformes and there-
fore potentially diffuse more readily is uncertain. In
2014/15 the H5N8 virus was diffused by wild birds
but also showed very little evidence of reassortment
[10]. Conversely in 2016/17 there was substantive
reassortment in wild birds whilst in early 2020 in
Europe it was proposed that newly detected H5N8
viruses were derived from reassortment of sub-
Saharan Africa viruses with those of LPAI of Eurasia
origin [10,11]. Here we have co-circulation of at
least three 2.3.4.4b H5 variants. Key to mitigating
the risk to poultry will be understanding ongoing evol-
ution, identifying where these viruses emerged from,
mitigating endemic disease in poultry to avoid these
production systems potentially acting as a future
source for emerging variants and characterizing host
tropisms and the role of wild birds in spreading
disease.
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